Hello and welcome to DEEPER LOOK coming to you once again from Washington.

I'm Del Irani. It's great to have your company.

Uncertainties in the Indo-Pacific show no signs of easing.

The biggest concern is China's increasing pressure in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait.

Developments in the Middle East and Ukraine are adding to the unease,

potentially affecting stability in the Indo-Pacific region.

So, what are the biggest risks that threaten regional stability?

And how can Japan and the US mitigate them?

I continue my conversation with Richard Armitage, one of the foremost voices on Japan-US relations.

Mr. Armitage is former Deputy Secretary of State under US President George W. Bush,

and has held numerous diplomatic positions.

He's been deeply involved in US security policy in the Indo-Pacific region throughout his illustrious career.

Welcome back to the program, Mr. Armitage; great to have you with us again.

Thank you.

Mr. Armitage, the security landscape in the Indo-Pacific region is rapidly changing.

What are you most worried about right now?

I'm most concerned, first of all, with the possibility that the US might flirt,

I hope temporarily only, with isolationism,

and that can cause a certain amount of adventurism by countries such as China or North Korea,

who can threaten certain allies and friends of ours.

And regarding Japan, I'm very concerned with what's called the "Tyranny of Proximity."

That is Japan and China, are so close together,

that any small wobbles could rapidly develop into something quite large.

Recently, we had an example in Kinmen, off of Taiwan, between Chinese fishermen and the Taiwanese Coast Guard.

They're so cheek-by-jowl that an accident can happen.

Or look more closely, Japan and Senkakus, where we have coast guard ships, gray hull Navy ships bumping up against each other,

or aircraft flying into air defense intercept zones.

The possibility of an accident, kicking off something more broadly, is very real.

We found it in 2001, when we had reconnaissance aircraft that ran into a Chinese fighter.

We were able to defuse that situation.

But one of the reasons is, we had thousands and thousands of miles between us,

to give the leadership on both sides time and space to think about what the next move was.

When your cheek-by-jowl, you don't have the luxury of time.

Mr. Armitage, you've been involved in US-Taiwan policy for years.

In fact, you visited Taiwan as a member of Biden administration's first unofficial delegation in 2021.

Now, China has repeatedly said that it will not renounce using force to unify Taiwan.

How long, in your opinion, do you think it will be before China will take Taiwan by force?

The thought process in Beijing be affected by many things:

by the closeness of countries like the United States to Taiwan,

by the movement towards a more effective relationship towards Taiwan,

by Japan, by what happens in Ukraine.

If the vastly outnumbered and outgunned Ukrainian armed forces can hold their own against the Russian forces,

this will not be ignored in Beijing.

It's a long way of saying: I think we're quite a ways off from China doing which I believe they did not want to do,

which is to physically invade Taiwan.

From the US perspective, what role would the US like Tokyo to play right now, when it comes to the issue of Taiwan?

First of all, we have to acknowledge that Tokyo, in the last two or three years,

has moved farther towards Taiwan, in recognition of the fact that Taiwan,

their survival and their ability to thrive is extraordinarily important to Japan.

And Taiwan's role, the first island chain, is of vital importance to Japan.

So, at a minimum, I think Japan should be able to support the United States,

if it was necessary, in a contingency, to be much more involved.

Also to support Taiwan in the development, further development, of her democracy

and of her approach to respect for human rights and human dignity.

We're not looking for Japan to be involved militarily.

We would be looking for Japan to support us, if it was necessary,

unfortunately, for us to be in some manner involved militarily.

So, is the Biden administration addressing the challenges posed by China effectively, in your opinion?

I mean, what is needed to be done urgently?

I think you have to view China correctly, through 2020 lenses.

China is not ten feet tall. At all.

First time in my history, a leader of China has a bad relationship with the PLA, the People's Liberation Army.

China has an economy which is entirely heading south with no real, observable changes on the horizon.

Huge unemployment, particularly on the youth,

rising discontent, because it's harder and harder for Chinese to travel.

So, let's view China as a potential threat.

But also, in real terms, about how tall and are strong they really are.

I really disagree with the Biden administration, the way quote "manage China."

Successive US administrations tried to manage China.

Whether it's in terms of competition.

My own view is: we need to win; that's not war.

We're gonna have a competition; we need to win it, not to manage it.

So, you don't agree with the way the Biden administration is managing the China relationship.

Part of it has been very effective.

If you look at the approach to Northeast Asia,

you have the United States, Japan, Korea, now on board, on side with three of us;

Australia, India, with the QUAD.

All these things have been managed quite well by the Biden administration.

Other aspects I think have been less well managed has been, in my view, a general overlooking of Southeast Asia,

of Indonesia, the largest Muslim nation, Malaysia, Thailand, a treaty ally.

So, to the Biden administration, I think, I would give a B, if I were a professor.

What do they need to do to get an A++? What needs to be done urgently?

They've got to approach each nation in and of itself,

and understand the hopes and aspirations of each nation of in and of itself,

and not try to impose our own approach to the world.

There are different styles of democracy in the world.

Japan and the US do different democracy, for instance.

So, we have to recognize there can be different approaches to human rights, to individual freedoms.

It's not that we should walk away from our values.

But I think we ought to make sure that our own house is entirely in order,

before we try to give sermons to others, about their house.

(We) don't want to force countries to make a decision.

That's the nightmare in Asia, that nations have to decide between the United States and China.

And that's... again, proximity plays a role here.

So, there's plenty of room for differences of views and different approaches.

For the stability of the Indo-Pacific and counterbalancing China, what role can India play?

How can Japan and the US get India more involved?

Well, first of all, we're not going to be the ones who get India more involved.

First of all, as a maritime nation, India is involved in the lifeblood of the region.

It was India, who first sounded the siren about piracy, in the Horn of Africa.

It was India to whom Prime Minister Abe addressed himself, in large measure,

during his first time as prime minister, in recognition of democratization of a country,

if they grew an economic power, would be part of the entire global trading system.

That's what's going to get India more involved: not to be seen as having to take sides.

India has their own neuralgic issues with China, the Siachen Glacier.

India has neuralgic issues with Pakistan,

who has the, quote, "special relationship with China."

So, there's every reason for India, because of her own necessity and needs,

to be involved and be somewhat like-minded with Japan and the United States.

There are different arguments or different viewpoints about how the US should cooperate with India,

under its current Prime Minister Modi, to bring stability in the Indo-Pacific.

In your opinion, what kind of relations need to be built with India?

I don't believe it would be possible to move forward with India,

if we're seen as is trying to play the great game with India.

This is a mature country.

This is a country, most populous in the world,

they're able to come to judgments as to what's in their national interest.

Thus far, as a general matter, their judgments have been that, in the main,

their interest lies with the US, with Japan, with Australia.

How worried are you that countries in Asia Pacific, whether it's China or North Korea

might be looking at what's going on in the world, and see that the US is distracted?

It's got a presidential election; its resources are getting depleted.

And this could be an opportune time to, you know, pursue their own interests.

Is that something that you think is of concern?

Is it possible? Sure.

But please, let me remind the viewers that during the Cold War,

we were involved in a huge struggle with the Soviet Union,

a huge struggle in Afghanistan, a huge struggle in Central America, a huge struggle in Africa.

The US can do more than one thing at a time.

And I think that will continue,

particularly if we enjoy the company of good allies and good friends, such as Japan.

Mr. Armitage, thank you so much for your time. It was great talking to you once again.

The pleasure was mine.

Clearly, it's a tough road ahead, but there is strength in numbers.

Countries in the Indo-Pacific will have to be laser-focused on reinforcing ties with like-minded nations,

in a united front to mitigate against regional and global risks.

I'm Del Irani, thanks for your company.

I'll see you next time on DEEPER LOOK.