Hello and welcome to DEEPER LOOK.

I'm Del Irani, it's great to have your company.

Japanese Prime Minister Kishida Fumio was recently in Washington on an official visit,

the first by a Japanese leader since 2015.

He was warmly welcomed by US President Joe Biden,

and the two leaders reaffirmed their commitment to be "global partners," deepening defense ties.

They also held an historic trilateral summit with Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr.,

strengthening their partnership amid rising tensions in the South China Sea.

So, just how significant was this official visit of the Japanese Prime Minister to Washington?

And what impact could the outcomes have on the regional security of the Indo-Pacific?

Joining us now to discuss this further is Christopher Johnstone.

He's a Senior Adviser and Japan Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Prior to this role, Mr. Johnstone served in the US government for 25 years in a variety of senior positions,

including twice on the National Security Council, as Director for East Asia under President Biden.

Welcome to the program, Mr. Johnstone. Great to have you with us.

Thank you. Great to be here.

So, you have this unique perspective, because you have worked with the US government for so long.

What did you think of the recent meeting between the Japanese Prime Minister and the US President?

It's important to start by emphasizing the importance and the significance

of an official visit of a leader to the United States.

Visits like this, official visits or state visits, there are only one or two a year that the White House offers,

and they represent the highest level of diplomatic honors that the White House can accord to a foreign leader.

So, they very much reflect the priority that the United States places on a relationship.

And I think for President Biden, Prime Minister Kishida is a particularly significant and consequential Japanese leader.

And there are a number of reasons for that.

I mean, I think, Prime Minister Kishida was a strong leader on support for Ukraine,

after the invasion by Russia in 2022.

He announced historic national security and defense strategies in late 2022,

which truly put Japan on a new strategic trajectory.

And then he was a very effective steward of the G7 process last year,

culminating in the leaders' meeting at Hiroshima.

What's interesting, Mr. Johnstone, is that both leaders described the summit as historic.

What was also differently unique about this meeting?

Yeah, well, there were a number of significant deliverables that came out of it.

I think the most important was the announcement that the two countries

intend to upgrade the command structure that connects the United States and Japan.

Now, this is a bit of a technical military issue,

but the way to think about it is that the United States and Japan historically

have never actually had a true military alliance in the way that we think of it, right?

And when we think about the NATO alliance, with the deep integration of partners in Europe, under a unified command structure,

when you think about the alliance with Korea, which has the mantra of "fight-tonight,"

with, again, deep integration of forces and leadership, ready to respond on a moment's notice to provocations.

That's not what the history of the US-Japan alliance has been.

And that's because, for decades, Japan was not a significant military partner;

in fact, it was the opposite.

The United States didn't expect much of Japan in a military sense.

Japan was really a platform for US operations, and not much more than that.

So, what this announcement signifies is a movement toward a true military alliance,

in which we're much more closely knitted together, under separate chains of command—that's an important point to make.

But seated much more side-by-side, with empowered military commanders on both sides,

who can deepen cooperation on a day-to-day basis.

How crucial is this development in responding to China's efforts to alter the status quo

in relation to the South China Sea or Taiwan, through coercion and military means?

Yeah, so, this is a step that, again, potentially,

once implemented, makes the US-Japan alliance much more credible, nimble,

able to respond on short notice to developments in the region.

Today, if there were a Chinese invasion of Taiwan,

the United States and Japan would figure it out.

But it would take some work for us to cooperate closely in responding.

Having a true joint operational command structure on both sides, based in Japan,

would enable us to respond in a much more fluid, nimble way to crisis.

And so, the message that sends to the region is that the United States and Japan are ready.

What do you think of the timing of this announcement?

I mean, why are these issues being discussed right now?

And what are some of the factors that have made this resolution possible now?

Yeah, so I think, I think on the Japanese side,

I do think there has been a profound shift in public opinion.

Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine,

you really see a dramatic impact on the Japanese public's views of defense,

defense spending, and the alliance with the United States.

And I think it's because, quite simply,

it's the recognition that major war is still possible in the 21st century.

As unfortunate as that is, major war is still possible,

and that Japan needs to be better positioned to defend itself.

On the American side, there's been a mindset shift as well.

I think this administration has placed an emphasis on allies.

But it's not just because we think allies are nice and they should be treated well.

I think the Biden Administration's view is that the United States needs strong allies,

empowered allies, allies who bring something to the table themselves.

And so, this administration has been willing to take steps that previous administrations have not,

to enable Japan to be a more powerful, more capable defense partner.

Following the Japan-US summit, the first-ever trilateral summit, involving Japan, the US and Philippines, also took place.

So, why was it important to bring all three countries together and not just have,

you know, separate bilateral meetings with both of them?

This was a historic meeting, actually.

And one that really also reflects the realities of the security environment.

I mean, President Duterte in the Philippines was threatening to abrogate, to end

some of the key military agreements, that were in place between the United States and the Philippines.

So here we are just a couple of years later, a 180-degree shift.

Japan has long had a close relationship with the Philippines.

Now the three countries are meeting together.

And it's remarkable if you look at that joint statement,

how much of it is explicitly aimed at responding to problematic Chinese behavior in the South China Sea.

No, no punches pulled in that joint statement.

So again, I think, you know, when you think about what's new in the Indo-Pacific region,

these bilateral alliances the United States has are getting stronger—that's new,

they're all getting stronger, basically, at the same time.

That's new, certainly since the end of the Cold War.

Also, what's important are the linkages among them.

So, in this case, it's the US, Japan and the Philippines, but we've seen a similar trend

with the US, Japan and the Republic of Korea, with the US, Japan and Australia.

With the rise of the QUAD.

All these things, I think really signal how the region is responding to what it sees as potential revisionism.

So, then let me ask you a little bit about the strategy behind what you just said.

You know, we've seen in recent times this kind of emergence of minilateral meetings,

such as the QUAD, AUKUS, the Japan-US-South Korea Summit.

So, kind of groupings of three or four different countries.

You know, why is the US pursuing the strategy of having these minilateral meetings?

Yeah, so we're a long way from having a NATO in Asia.

I think that's unlikely to ever develop, at least not anytime soon.

But we are seeing the rise of these groupings, focused on particular common challenges,

sort of based upon common concerns and common interests.

And each one is a little bit different in their orientation, right?

The US-Japan-ROK still remains principally focused on North Korea, although it has an increasingly broad agenda.

US-Japan-Philippines, focused on maritime issues in the East and the South China Sea.

So slightly different focuses.

But I think that collectively what these groupings signal is that

the region is coming together in these interlocking sets of relationships,

in response to primarily concerns about China.

And it sends a message to Beijing,

that any decision to use force or to use coercion to achieve its objectives,

they would not be able to undertake that in just a bilateral context.

They would encounter resistance from multiple parts of the region.

And I would note also, increasingly have real substance behind them.

When I, you know, when I first was working on the US-Japan-Australia defense relationship, for example, some years ago,

it was really just an annual photo op.

The defense ministers would get together, chat for 30 minutes, release a statement, but there wasn't much going on.

There's real meat in these agendas now, that involves training and exercises and information sharing,

things that add up to meaningful partnerships.

So not a formal treaty alliance, but moving down that road.

In the Japan-US summit, the two countries emphasized the need to have dialogue with China,

and, you know, to get China to cooperate in terms of overcoming the common challenges.

China's response has, of course, been accusing Japan and the US of a smear campaign.

What impact does the deepening of ties between Japan and the US,

especially when it comes to defense cooperation, have on relations with China?

Yeah, well, of course, China views these developments with a fair amount of concern,

whether it's the strengthening of the US-Japan alliance, or this developing minilateral cooperation.

We see criticism of it repeatedly, whenever there are meetings like this.

One thing I do want to emphasize is,

and I think this is certainly true of the United States, certainly true of Japan, true of all partners.

No one wants a new Cold War in Asia, no one is interested in dividing the region into blocs.

This is about deterrence and preventing conflict from happening.

All of our countries, including the United States,

want to continue to have a beneficial economic relationship with China.

And I think the issue ahead of us is figuring out how to balance these two interests, right?

This interest, on the one hand, in strengthening deterrence,

on the other hand, sustaining a beneficial economic interdependence relationship.

And so, I think there will be a push and pull over time between the United States and Japan,

between United States and South Korea, and with others, as we all work to get this balance right.

It's not easy; but no one wants a new Cold War.

So, Mr. Johnstone, how will the outcome of the recent summit and the relationship

between the Japan and US be affected by the upcoming US presidential election?

Yeah, this is the question of the day. There's no...

domestic politics in both countries, I think, is one point to make here...

sort of signals some uncertainty ahead, right?

I mean, we're in the midst here in the United States of a presidential campaign.

Prime Minister Kishida has his own political headwinds in Japan.

I think what I would say is that this visit by Kishida really sort of drove home the bipartisan nature of the US-Japan relationship,

and how much the relationship benefits both parties and the American people across the country.

So, Prime Minister Kishida gave a speech to Congress while he was here,

that really emphasized the role Japan is playing in the world

and the economic benefits that flow from Japanese investment in the United States.

He visited two factories, a Toyota factory, a Honda factory in North Carolina,

that are going to employ large numbers of Americans.

So, very much an effort to put a bipartisan spotlight on the relationship.

No question that politics in the United States will impact the relationship.

I think it would be dishonest to say otherwise.

But one thing I would say is, I think there's a strong foundation under US-Japan relations,

and that the shared concerns about China are pretty powerful,

and they're felt in both parties,

and I think will serve as an anchor, regardless of who is elected in November.

Christopher Johnstone, thank you so much for your time and insights.

It was great having you on the show once again.

Great. Thanks very much for having me.

According to both the Japanese and US governments,

relations between the two countries are stronger than ever.

While the recent official visit in Washington focused on strengthening security and defense ties,

it's likely that the Japan-US alliance will continue to evolve, to meet the shifting geopolitical dynamics,

not just in the Indo-Pacific, but beyond.

I'm Del Irani. Thanks for your company.

I'll see you next time on DEEPER LOOK.