Hello and welcome to DEEPER LOOK.

I'm Del Irani, it's great to have your company.

These images of pomp and circumstance commemorated North Korea's 75th founding anniversary.

In attendance, proudly watching on was North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, with his young daughter by his side.

Also, a couple days before the parade, there was the unveiling of a tactical nuclear attack submarine,

which North Korea claims is capable carrying nuclear arms.

So given this show of strength, just how firm is Kim Jong Un's grip on power?

And how should the US and its Asian allies respond to his accelerating nuclear program?

Joining me once again is Sydney Seiler, Senior Advisor at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

He was the National Intelligence Officer for North Korea, at the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, from 2020 through July this year.

With more than 40 years dedicated to watching North Korea, Sydney has also served the US Forces Korea and multiple US intelligence agencies.

Welcome back to the program, Mr. Seiler.

Great to have you with us.

Del, thank you very much.

So recently, there were festivities and a military parade in Pyongyang, commemorating the 75th founding anniversary of North Korea.

What was your interpretation of this event? How did you view it?

So, I've been watching these for a long time, as you can imagine, and, you know,

we in particular, during, you know, quinquennial celebrations, you know,

where the anniversary is divisible by five or, or on a decade, you see a little larger scale,

because these are significant events, the 75th anniversary of the founding of the DPRK.

I think, in that regard, there was nothing spectacular about the parade.

It was noteworthy, the civilian emphasis, the fact that there were civilian vehicles, retrofitted to accommodate rocket launchers.

You know, it is a reminder of the militaristic state that North Korea is.

So I think, Westerners when they look at North Korea, what they find it hard to understand completely,

is just how much it is, you know, everybody's a part of the military.

And this military civilian tie is so key to their identity.

And it drives their behavior.

And it drives the limitations.

You know, we face this, I think this has been an obstacle in our negotiations on the nuclear issue over time,

where military strength is really so much a sole element of power, that it gets a hyper emphasis.

And, you know, a few days before the parade, what was also unveiled during the commemorations of this event,

was a tactical nuclear attack submarine.

Are these weapons really capable of carrying a large amount of nuclear arms, as the administration would claim?

So, over the history of the growth of the North Korean nuclear issue, we face this challenge where, you know,

the capabilities demonstrated and claimed, exceed what one might otherwise assess to be,

how sophisticated, or how mature, or how reliable these systems are.

So North Korea is seeking to portray capabilities far beyond what they actually have.

In the interest of seeking to establish capabilities to enable their coercion, to enable their intimidation, enable their blackmail,

in terms of what North Korea has said it wanted as a nuclear-powered, nuclear-missile-capable submarine, this falls short of that.

You know, will this perform as intended?

How easy will it be to detect, and follow, and defeat in time of conflict?

There'll be a lot of debate on that.

Kim is clearly moving forward, and all these developments are troubling.

But you know, I'm not going to pretend to say that, you know, North Korea is now in a world-class nuclear submarine power.

Tell me about what you think of Kim Jong Un's leadership. He came to power 10 years ago.

How are things going for him? Does he have a firm grip on power?

Well, if you set the standards in a way that are easy to achieve,

and for me, it's about survival and regime sustainability;

it's not about making the DPRK a world-class economy;

it's not about the DPRK being a world-class diplomatic power;

it's not even necessarily about building the standard and quality of living for the people of the DPRK.

There's no mechanisms, there's no, you know, pressure mechanisms that the leadership of the DPRK

would feel particular blowback from sustained poverty, sustained malnutrition, sustained economic hardship.

So, in that regard, what Kim has done is he has resisted international pressure to denuclearize.

He's resisted, you know, any pressure to change, or reform, or open, whether from without or within,

and the regime seems to be well-positioned to survive for the foreseeable future.

How would you describe the economic situation in North Korea, particularly post COVID?

You know, when the borders were closed for a while, there were no supplies going through; of course, the UN sanctions as well.

Has there been enough food and supplies for non-elite North Korean citizens,

and what impact does the economic standard country have on Kim Jong Un's grip on power?

Well, in terms of... I mean, the situation is bad.

I mean, and in any given year, there is a shortfall of grains and other foodstuffs

necessary to move a large part of the population out of the at-risk or malnutrition categories.

This is a country that survives without thriving...

We do not see the state of the economy impacting North Korea's diplomacy, particularly its denuclearization diplomacy.

It was never driven to the table out of economic need with more flexibility.

Nor did it walk away from the table, necessarily because it was doing fine on the economic side.

You know, North Korea makes sure that when and if they engage in negotiations, they do so with the least amount of vulnerabilities.

So, it's not like economic hardships open up possibilities for diplomacy, as contrary to some.

And then that is somewhat tied to the last point,

which is we have never seen economic hardships reflecting any meaningful questions of Kim, his policies or challenges to the regime.

How do you explain this country manages to build and test so many nuclear missiles?

I mean, this is a very costly affair.

Where's all the money coming from?

The US government has stated that you know, and most recently, for example,

in terms of their cryptocurrency heist and their success in the cyber domain, in terms of stealing cryptocurrency or other currencies;

North Korea gets a... the surge that we've seen over the past few years in North Korea's earnings in these areas,

do coincide with a surge in missile launches.

And I think we've estimated as much as possibly 50% of foreign currency earnings right now are coming from this type of activity.

And so, the foreign currency is available, unfortunately.

So, there are elements of the program that are less dependent upon foreign currency or acquiring technologies from abroad.

But, you know, in terms of the prioritization that Kim gives the program,

you know, unfortunately, again, at the expense of providing for the livelihood of the North Korean people economically,

the prioritization of this WMD program ensures that it's adequately funded.

Now, all that said, this is also where, you know,

the pressure and isolation and sanctions efforts of the international community,

based upon United Nations Security Council resolutions, a lot of active diplomacy,

active diplomacy by the United States, Japan, Republic of Korea, EU and others,

does help curtail the amount of resources available to the program.

Given the intelligence information on hand, is there actually a possibility that

North Korea will give up its nuclear weapons and its nuclear programs anytime soon?

I have a wise mentor who once told me, "Never say never."

His experience as a career analyst, this is, you know, across the globe,

you know, we've been caught by surprise, and nation states can make sudden pivots.

And so, a bit of humility on that assessment is always warranted.

I think secondly, as dire and pessimistic as our assessments of that possibility sound,

that should never allow us, and it has not allowed us to give up on diplomacy.

I was part of the Obama administration, both working at the National Security Council, and then participating in negotiations with North Korea.

And through that period, we were pessimistic and realistic.

But that didn't stop us from repeated attempts to resume diplomacy with North Korea.

And so, even if the assessment is... if our assessment is right, and they'll never denuclearize, no harm done.

There's a lot of value in seeking to promote diplomacy for a variety of reasons.

If we're, you know, if we're wrong, then we are prepared for dialogue at any time with North Korea,

to address all of its concerns, and move forward towards a denuclearized Korean peninsula.

So, where do US-North Korea relations stand right now?

I mean, if you were still in the administration, what would you be telling them?

I mean, should we still be trying to engage with North Korea?

I think, all things considered, this administration's policy on North Korea has been rock solid.

And it has been based upon: one, keeping the door open for negotiations.

You know, we knew there were a lot of factors at play, COVID...

You know, maybe North Korea's own R&D objectives, wanting to achieve some type of advancements before sitting down at the table.

We have never kept the door closed. We ensure sufficient deterrence.

This is crucial, particularly as we see a program that is growing.

And if the Russians decide to help North Korea in conventional realm,

the growth in the conventional realm is as troubling as the growth in WMD realm.

Because again, it emboldens Kim, and it really raises the likelihood of the potential use of those capabilities.

So, we do everything possible to remind Kim Jong Un that we have nuclear submarines, like the USS Kentucky,

that we can fly B-52s, that we can deploy strategic assets.

And then, not only that, that we have a strong alliance, and this speaks to the value and power of the trilateral alliance,

that North Korea's efforts to try to break off, you know, drive a wedge between Seoul and Washington are failing.

North Korea's efforts, mirroring those of China, to try to isolate Japan are failing.

And so that type of diplomatic unity has a deterrence value, all of its own.

So, building on the strengths of the alliances, which has been a centerpiece of the Biden administration,

resuming military exercises, bringing them up to necessary levels, deploying extended deterrence capabilities,

particularly to reassure the people of Japan, people of Republic of Korea,

that the United States is committed to the defense of the Korean Peninsula,

this is, all things considered, you know, the best possible policy we can have at this time.

My very last question to you, before we wrap. That's from the US perspective.

Now, give me your insights and advice from the Asian perspective, particularly those allies, South Korea and Japan.

As North Korea prepares, and I think they're going to gradually open the aperture on their diplomacy,

in the post-COVID diplomacy, I can imagine some outreach to Southeast Asian countries.

And here are some opportunities to cooperate and work with

the United States, Japan, Republic of Korea, like-minded countries, to keep that pressure up on North Korea.

Not necessarily to not engage North Korea, but to make sure that the type of engagement that you have

is supportive of and contributes to denuclearization stability in the region.

And I do believe that if there's any possibility of changing North Korea's views over the long haul,

or to reduce the likelihood that they will go down the Vladimir Putin-like path in Ukraine,

that they would do the same thing with South Korea, is to see that sustained international cooperation on the issue.

That will be an important element of deterrence going forward.

Sydney Seiler, we really appreciate your time.

- I truly enjoyed it. Great questions, Del. Thank you.
- Thank you.

Although it is difficult to predict what North Korea will do next,

it's clear that the situation will remain volatile for the foreseeable future.

Having said that, the US and its Asian allies will have to be vigilant, in watching and carefully responding to the actions of this regime.

I'm Del Irani, thanks for your company.

I'll see you next time on DEEPER LOOK.