Impacts of North Korea-Russia Summit: Sydney Seiler / Senior Adviser and Korea Chair, Center for Strategic and International Studies

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and Russian President Vladimir Putin met for a rare summit where they reportedly discussed expanding cooperation on military technologies. What did Kim seek to gain from the summit, what was achieved, and what are the implications for neighboring Asian countries, the US and the rest of the world? Senior Adviser and Korea Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Sydney Seiler offers his analyses.

Del Irani
DEEPER LOOK Host

Sydney Seiler
Senior Adviser and Korea Chair, Center for Strategic and International Studies

Transcript

00:12

Hello and welcome to DEEPER LOOK.

00:14

I'm Del Irani, it's great to have your company.

00:17

Warm handshakes... friendly smiles...

00:20

And a personalized tour of Russia's space rocket launch site.

00:24

These were just some of the highlights from a recent 6-day visit

00:28

between North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and Russian President Vladimir Putin.

00:33

It was Mr. Kim's first overseas trip in more than four years.

00:37

The two leaders called each other comrade and toasted their friendship.

00:42

So, what exactly did Kim Jong Un seek to gain from the summit, and how much did he achieve?

00:48

And what are the implications for neighboring countries in Asia, the U.S., and the rest of the world?

00:55

Joining me now to talk more about this is Sydney Seiler, Senior Advisor at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

01:01

He was the National Intelligence Officer for North Korea

01:04

at the Office of the Director of National Intelligence from 2020 through July of this year.

01:09

With more than 40 years dedicated to watching North Korea,

01:12

Sydney has also served multiple U.S. intelligence agencies.

01:16

Welcome to the program Sydney Seiler. Great to have you with us.

01:20

Thank you very much, Del. I appreciate the invitation.

01:23

So, you know Sydney, you've been a North Korean watcher for a very long time, as I just mentioned.

01:28

I would love to know what was your reaction when you first heard of this summit between Russia and North Korea?

01:34

Did it come as a shock or a surprise to you? Or were you largely expecting this?

01:42

Well, let me say first of all, this was part of the brilliance of the White House deciding to go ahead

01:47

before the fact and release of some of the information that was known about the upcoming summit.

01:52

It took that element of shock and surprise, which is usually part of the choreography of North Korea,

02:00

in everything it does, whether it be the missile launch or diplomacy or other diplomatic initiative.

02:06

It is designed to maximize the impact of the image.

02:10

The symbolism becomes substantive.

02:12

In the case of the most recent visit, as you step back and move beyond that,

02:16

that choreography of the surprise visit - it was unprecedented in ways that Vladimir Putin

02:24

opened up his defense industries and military bases for Kim to visit.

02:30

And the messaging of the strong defense alliance came out.

02:34

That clearly was something we had not seen.

02:37

You know, this was mutual need. People have thrown the word desperation out there.

02:41

That Vladimir Putin is desperate because of the current munitions inventory levels of his forces.

02:48

He needs something North Korea has. North Korea has something that Vladimir Putin needs.

02:55

The deal itself did not require a summit, but you know,

02:59

maybe the summit was part of the price tag that Vladimir Putin was willing to pay

03:04

in order to secure what he was able to out of Kim.

03:08

And Kim, it was a low risk, low-cost action for him.

03:12

He can walk away declaring success just by the images

03:17

that flowed out of all the actions, all the events in which he participated.

03:25

How significant is it that, you know,

03:27

Kim Jong Un actually traveled to Russia and that he stayed as long as he did?

03:31

The fact that he went to these various military sites and looked at these

03:35

advanced Russian weapons was somewhat interesting.

03:38

And you know, I think one thing that we might compare it to is, although it is apples and oranges -

03:45

when President Yoon visited the USS Kentucky while it was in harbor down at Pusan.

03:53

You have this great power, state of the art, lethal capability being visited by a foreign leader.

03:59

And so, in the message that is projected by that is our capabilities,

04:05

those of the United States, are your capabilities, Mr. President.

04:08

We have your back.

04:10

And maybe Kim was trying to capture that.

04:12

I've got an ally; I've got a friend.

04:14

And he's got some pretty awesome capabilities of his own.

04:18

Yeah, we just deployed this submarine with, you know, with possible ability to launch SLBMs.

04:27

And people are mocking it because it's only a diesel, not nuclear powered.

04:31

But I've got a friend and he's got awesome stuff that I can rely on as well.

04:35

So that I think may have accounted for some of the unique nature of Kim's visits the various sites,

04:41

to the Space Center, the aircraft factory, Vladivostok navy base.

04:47

One of the things that North Korea has been struggling with is its spy satellite program.

04:52

How can Russia help North Korea with spy technology?

04:55

And why exactly, you know, does North Korea want satellites in the first place?

04:59

I mean, what is it likely to do with this technology?

05:03

Great questions. Well, you know, Vladimir Putin, first of all mentioned that no deals were made.

05:08

And well, he gave an acknowledgment that the visit to the space center was in part

05:14

because there was going to be some discussions on Russia helping North Korea.

05:19

It wasn't quite clear what that help would be.

05:22

Because remember, what we had is a two failure launches of this new vehicle.

05:28

This new delivery mechanism.

05:31

Why exactly did they fail? I do not know.

05:33

Are the Russians able to provide Kim with assistance to fix it?

05:37

Are they intending to provide him with a fully operational rocket?

05:41

Are they planning to offer Kim the ability to launch a North Korean satellite out of Russia or vice versa?

05:49

That's all not quite that clear.

05:52

North Korea has demonstrated over the past several years,

05:56

the ability to launch missiles that can achieve some significant ranges.

06:01

But you know, they also have to know where to shoot these missiles.

06:05

And so, part of having a reconnaissance capability is the ability for both targeting,

06:11

as well as battle damage assessment in time of war.

06:14

This was not mentioned or discussed.

06:16

And it's often not mentioned by the experts, but it's nevertheless out there,

06:19

that Russia might enter some type of intelligence sharing agreement with North Korea.

06:24

That it would provide that type of imagery.

06:27

Among all those scenarios are all potentially violations of United Nations Security Council resolutions.

06:34

And of course, they would provide a significant enhancement to North Korea's nuclear capabilities.

06:40

That would be you know, just fundamentally destabilizing in their nature.

06:45

I want to also talk about what the North Korean leader can do

06:48

in terms of how they might be able to help Russia.

06:51

What does North Korea have to offer in terms of ammunition and weapons?

06:56

What could it actually... How could it actually help Russia?

06:59

Well, you know... so, Russia is as everybody knows is,

07:03

you know, even if you're not an expert, which I'm not on the Russian military,

07:07

has been seeking to find sources for munitions because they've just expended

07:12

so many during their actions, their military actions against Ukraine.

07:18

And in case of North Korea, you've got a country that has a lot of Soviet era systems.

07:25

Where there's at least some degree of interoperability between the munitions that North Korea has,

07:31

and the systems that would fire them that Russia possesses.

07:35

You know, these are the range of like artillery shells and other rockets, potentially.

07:43

And, the assumption is, and I won't speak to the accuracy of the assumption that North Korea

07:49

has massive stockpiles of this type of ammunition that they could easily ship to Russia.

07:55

It'll take a time to get it physically across the border, all the way out to the front,

08:00

but nevertheless, that there are these munitions that North Korea has that Russia needs.

08:05

Now, some of these are old and dated, so their misfire rates might be high.

08:10

But I think when you're in a desperate situation like Russia is,

08:14

you're there willing to take whatever they can get.

08:22

How would China be viewing the fact that North Korea and Russia

08:25

are having closer ties and held this summit?

08:29

The potential interactions to include Russia's possible provision of satellite related

08:36

or missile related or even conventional military technologies to help replenish North Korea zone,

08:44

shortfalls and stockpiles or antiquated-like weapons systems, repairing old Soviet era aircraft -

08:52

All of this has the potential to be very destabilizing.

08:56

Not just because Kim Jong Un will have better capabilities,

09:00

but that he may feel emboldened to behave in a way that otherwise Beijing would be reluctant to see him behave.

09:07

If somehow, he looks to Vladimir Putin as a model of somebody

09:11

who has used military force to attempt to achieve diplomatic objectives,

09:17

and if Kim feels that he might've been given a green light, or at least a flashing yellow light,

09:23

this is something China clearly would not appreciate.

09:26

So, I would imagine that well, on the one hand,

09:30

China is probably pleased by the fact that this Russian-DPRK interaction has troubled the United States,

09:37

has kind of resurfaced claims that somehow this is a failure of US policy,

09:45

that there has been a breakthrough in Russian-DPRK relations.

09:49

But I think China knows that it's very limited in terms of what that really means.

09:55

And at the end of the day, there's a lot of unanswered questions.

09:58

And I think that is why, for now, China's been very reticent to take a public position

10:04

as they seek to find out just exactly what's entailed here.

10:08

What impact is this going to have on North Korea's relationship with China?

10:14

Well, so North Korea clearly will seek to use the improved relationship with Russia

10:19

to try to urge China to be more accepting of North Korea's position on a variety of issues.

10:27

As troublesome as both Beijing and Moscow have been in terms of cooperating with us

10:34

on Security Council resolutions and other actions within the UN to respond to

10:40

North Korea's repeated missile launches over the past two years.

10:46

In spite of that, China continues to articulate a commitment to denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

10:53

China continues to call for a resumption of those types of talks.

10:58

And that probably, when I look at what Kim Jong Un walked away from, his 2018, 2019 diplomacy, with, was a failure.

11:07

A failure to secure from either Beijing or Moscow an acceptance of a nuclear North Korea.

11:13

And I think what, you know, his longer-term goal,

11:16

maybe he won't be so active in pursuing the United States and/or South Korea.

11:22

Neither of whom are particularly likely to embrace a nuclear North Korea.

11:28

That he believes he can win China over to his side over time.

11:32

And I think that's what he will try to use the advancements in relations with Russia.

11:40

So given these recent developments, take us inside the US administration.

11:45

Give us a sense of how they would have been looking at this Russia-North Korea Summit.

11:51

I also served as the National Security Council of Korea director,

11:54

so I had experience working in the interagency processing and formulating and implementing policy.

12:00

And you know, first of all, the diplomacy is a centerpiece of

12:04

what you need to do in response to the most recent developments.

12:08

We are, you know, the goals here are not simply to keep two countries

12:13

from getting together and establishing a relationship.

12:16

It is to prevent a transfer of munitions that will extend the suffering and deaths on the battlefield in Ukraine.

12:23

And it's the possibility that North Korea will become more dangerous and more aggressive,

12:29

given advancements to their program that Russia stands to provide.

12:33

And, you know, the best way that we can work to remind Moscow and Pyongyang that

12:39

there's a price to be paid by these behaviors, starts with multi-dimensional diplomacy.

12:45

It starts with working, of course, with China,

12:49

in order to make sure that it is understanding that it's a stakeholder in this as well.

12:54

Mr. Seiler, my last question to you: For the US allies in the region, particularly, South Korea and Japan,

13:02

what would be your advice to them in terms of how to respond to these latest developments,

13:07

the meeting between North Korea and Russia?

13:10

So, I would say first of all, have confidence.

13:13

Have confidence. I know, there's a lot of apocalyptic,

13:17

near apocalyptic-like writing about the emergence of this new world order,

13:21

the impact of a seemingly growing dominance by Beijing and Moscow.

13:28

You know, and at the end of the day, you know, just remember, this is, you know, the world powers.

13:36

Those who are advocates to liberal democracy, free market economy,

13:40

respecters of human rights, that have, you know, built, this international order.

13:45

It's still solid. It's still stable.

13:48

And in that regard, building the international support, cooperating with each other.

13:53

It's harder when we cooperate.

13:58

And that's why when you looked at the readout from Pyongyang,

14:02

and Beijing in particular to the Camp David summit, and their near anger.

14:09

That's exactly what one would expect if the summit was doing its job.

14:14

If we're proving to be an obstacle to nefarious intentions of actors in the region,

14:19

that's a good thing, not a bad thing.

14:22

Mr. Seiler, thank you so much for your time.

14:23

We really appreciate you joining us on the show.

14:26

Thank you very much. Enjoyed the questions.

14:29

With its rapid development of nuclear capabilities,

14:32

North Korea remains a complex security threat to Asia and the world.

14:37

So just how firm is Kim Jong Un's grip on power?

14:41

And how should the U.S. and its allies respond?

14:45

Join us next time as continue our conversation with Sydney Seiler on DEEPER LOOK.

14:50

I'm Del Irani, thanks for your company.

14:52

I'll see you then!