Hello and welcome to DEEPER LOOK.

I'm Del Irani, it's great to have your company.

The Biden administration is shifting more attention to focus on the Indo-Pacific.

The US is working with allies to counter China's expanding influence in the region.

In June, President Biden met Indian Prime Minister Modi in Washington

to discuss strengthening bilateral defense cooperation.

In August, the US hosted the trilateral summit with Japan and South Korea to cement their partnership.

So, what exactly is the US's strategy in the Indo-Pacific landscape?

And how can Japan cooperate to achieve these goals?

Joining me once again to talk more about this is Christopher Johnstone.

He is the Japan Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

He served as the Director of East Asia at the US National Security Council until last year.

And prior to that, he worked with the Secretary of Defense on South and Southeast Asia Affairs.

Mr. Johnstone, welcome back to the program. Great to have you with us again.

Thank you very much. It's great to be here.

So why is the US driving more attention now towards the Indo-Pacific region

then perhaps we've seen in recent years?

Yeah, this has been sort of an extended evolution.

As you know, under President Obama, we had something called the Pivot to Asia,

which also was intended to reflect a stronger focus on the region,

but in many ways fell short of a true focus.

I think what's taking place now is a clear recognition that the most important interests to the United States,

the most more economic interests, national security interests are rooted in the Indo-Pacific.

Some of our closest friends are there.

But then at the same time, some of the biggest security challenges are there.

And first and foremost, of course, is China.

Back in the Obama days, there was still a sense in the United States that engagement was the proper approach to China,

that engagement would serve to change China's behavior and effectively integrate it into the international system.

And what we've seen really since under President Trump, and now under President Biden

is a sense that China's a revisionist power, not a status quo power, a true challenge to the international system.

The Pivot to Asia policy was Obama's back in 2011.

That was engagement. So, what is the strategy now?

I mean, and why and how has it shifted over the years?

Now, there's a sense that China is unlikely to change as a result of engagement and dialogue.

And therefore, what the United States needs to do is focus on shaping the environment around China.

And that, by which I mean strengthening the treaty alliances that the United States has,

building new partnerships with others and what we might call mini-lateral partnerships in the region.

So, small groupings of countries,

the United States, Japan, and Australia, the United States, Japan and South Korea, AUKUS, the Quad,

working together to uphold an order that rests on the rule of law,

norms and principles that have been in place for the better part of a century.

And use that to sort of, use the strength of the environment around China to shape its behavior.

Rather than focus so much on doing so directly.

Prime Minister Modi visited Washington, DC and met with President Biden earlier this year.

What is the importance of India when it comes to the US's strategy towards the Indo Pacific?

Yeah, India is now a central focus of US policy toward the region.

It's hard to overstate how important India is in the way the Biden administration thinks about the region.

This is the world's largest democracy.

The world's largest country period, and by far the world's largest democracy.

It's an emerging tech center.

It's a terrific bridge to the Global South.

And, in that sense, it is an increasingly major focus for the administration.

No one, that I'm aware of, in the administration thinks that India will one day be a formal ally of the United States.

But there is a sense that there are a lot of common interests.

The Indians share concerns about China's behavior as well.

They're also committed to a free and open Indo-Pacific, to the rule of law in the region.

So, I think there's a sense that on important issues, cooperation is possible and that cooperation with India would be valuable.

I do think it's a long-term proposition.

There are many ways in which it's not easy for the United States to work with India.

But I also think it's fair to say that the relationship has changed in remarkable ways in the last 10 years.

Yeah, I really want to draw on your experience here,

because you have this unique experience of actually having worked at the Department of Defense for some time as well.

What are some of the challenges that the US faces when it comes to fostering collaboration with India,

particularly on the defense front?

Yeah, so there's a lot of history to overcome in the US-India relationship,

and frankly, some distrust that still lingers in the background.

But nonaligned tradition in India still runs deep.

And there is still skepticism, I think, in parts of the Indian system about cooperation with Washington.

And then there of course, there's things like the reality of a long-standing close military partnership that India has had with Russia,

and the heavy reliance of the Indian military on Russian equipment, Russian training.

But what we've seen, though, is a marked increase in defense engagement between the United States and India bilaterally.

You see India now engaged annually, the Malabar Exercise that includes Australia, Japan, and the United States.

Every year, you see a slow but noticeable shift in Indian procurement away from Russia, toward other Western countries.

So, the trend lines are good.

It's just important to keep in mind a realistic perspective about how quickly and how far all of this will go.

There are many countries still in the Indo-Pacific region,

that really are reluctant to take a side whether it's with the US or China.

What do you think are some of the reasons for this?

Yeah, that's very true.

Certainly, anytime you travel to Singapore or any of the other countries of ASEAN,

that's the first message you hear is, "don't make us choose."

Now, I think there's some complexity to that.

If you look at it in reality.

Take a country like Singapore, for example.

Singapore has very quietly chosen the United States as its priority defense partner.

And Singapore does all sorts of things, under the radar, to facilitate a US military presence in Southeast Asia.

The Philippines recently has taken very clear steps to sort of rebuild the alliance with the United States.

So actually, in some ways, I think some Southeast Asian countries are actually choosing.

They just don't like to highlight the fact that they are.

But look, I think it's certainly true that putting countries in the region in the position

where they have to align with the United States or align with China.

That's not going to be an effective approach for the United States.

And so, I think the Biden administration has tried to do that, generally.

But here's where I would be critical of the administration.

I think there's an impressive record being built on the security side,

but they suffer from the lack of a robust economic agenda in the region.

The collapse of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the inability of the United States to commit to free trade agreements.

This is a big hole in the strategy.

And I think it's important to be upfront about that.

There's an initiative called the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework,

which purports to have several initiatives that would offer economic benefits to the region.

But the reality is that (it's) nothing, nothing in comparison to what TPP offered.

And so that does hurt the United States.

There are some experts say, that point to exactly that the current lack of US economic and trade policies in the region

is what's causing its failure to sway countries that have strong economic connections to China.

How can the US change this demand dynamic?

I mean, what can the US do to improve all this in the future?

Yeah. So, I think that's right.

I mean, I think when you combine both the inability to offer market access, trade agreements,

with a more punitive approach to trade with China, export controls and restrictions on investment.

That's a challenging package for a lot of the region to get behind.

Even our own, even our closest allies, like Japan and South Korea.

So, look, it's my hope;

I am of the view that eventually the United States will rebuild support at home for free trade.

It's so obvious that trade benefits both our economy and economies of Asia.

However, I don't think it's likely to happen until we get past our...

the next US presidential election.

Well, one of the US's strongest allies, Japan,

they have managed to maintain a very complex relationship with China,

balancing both economic cooperation and of course, the security concerns.

How would you describe Japan's current approach towards China,

particularly in light of China's assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific region?

Yeah, Japan has a very interesting and nuanced approach to China.

On the one hand, there's a very robust security agenda that seeks to strengthen Japan's defense capabilities,

increasing defense spending by 60% over five years.

On the other hand, there is a deep economic interdependence between Japan and China.

It's still a major location for Japanese direct investment, and still the largest trade partner for Japan.

And so, the stability in the economic relationship does continue to be important for Japan.

So Japanese leaders talk in terms of a constructive and stable relationship with Beijing.

One in which they can push back where they need to,

but at the same time, to the degree possible preserve economic ties.

What do you think Japan's role is in shaping the future of the Indo-Pacific?

I think Japan plays a really significant role in the Indo-Pacific.

They have tools that they bring to the table that the United States does not have.

First of all, it's really valuable to have such a powerful ally also speaking out forcefully on issues like the rule of law,

norms and principles in the region, pushing back on efforts to change the status quo.

I think it's very important.

Japan's voice on those things is very important.

Japan also brings huge economic resources through their foreign assistance programs that the United States doesn't have.

Japan can invest heavily in infrastructure,

can help support energy transition in Southeast Asia in a way that the United States can't.

So, they have a strong toolbox, if you will, that the United States doesn't have,

and, in that sense, is a great is a great compliment.

They're starting to build capacity in what we call in the United States, security assistance.

So, strengthening the capabilities of militaries in the region.

This is a new area for Japan, that its new defense policy will hopefully enable it to further develop.

I think that's a, sort of, an underused muscle.

I guess the one area where I do think Japan could have a somewhat stronger voice is on human rights.

Japan is not as forceful about speaking out about human rights abuses in Myanmar, for example, or in Cambodia.

How do you see the future of the Indo-Pacific region?

What are some of the most urgent issues that the US and Japan must work on with other countries

in order to enhance the stability in the region?

Yeah, so, I'm someone who's optimistic about the future of the Indo-Pacific.

I think it's quite possible, even likely that we will avoid major conflict in East Asia.

But I think we can't look past the risks.

I do think the Taiwan problem, challenge continues to loom large in the region.

So, I think the most important thing is,

in the near term, is for the United States in Japan to focus on strengthening deterrence.

Building up our military capacity, strengthening our alliances cooperation, working more closely with other allies.

As I've said the relationship with South Korea is particularly important, but also Australia.

To make the cost of using force so high that both Pyongyang and Beijing choose not to go that route.

So that's sort of step one.

And beyond that, it's continuing to build this affirmative agenda for East Asia

that shows what democracies and the rule of law have to offer

in terms of economic benefits, governance benefits for Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands.

I think it's those two things;

deterrence, and then an affirmative economic and governance agenda for the rest of the region going forward.

Christopher Johnstone, thank you so much for joining us.

We really appreciate you participating in the program. Thank you.

Thank you very much. I enjoyed it.

It's evident that the Indo-Pacific's shifting dynamics demand innovative approaches from nations big and small.

With the US, Japan, and others crafting strategies to foster stability amidst China's growing influence,

the region stands at a pivotal crossroads.

I'm Del Irani, thanks for your company.

I'll see you next time on DEEPER LOOK!