To counter China's influence in the Indo-Pacific, 14 countries, including the US and Japan, gathered on the sidelines of the 2023 APEC meeting to negotiate the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity. While agreements on trade are yet to be concluded, consensus was reached on "clean" and "fair" economy. How will the US-led initiative affect countries in the region? Michael Froman, former US Trade Representative, shares his insights.
Del Irani
DEEPER LOOK Host
Del Irani (left), Michael Froman (right)
Hello and welcome to DEEPER LOOK. Coming to you from New York.
I'm Del Irani, it's great to have your company.
The US is leading the negotiation of an economic partnership in the Indo-Pacific region.
The leaders of 14 countries, including the US and Japan,
gathered on the sidelines of the APEC meeting to negotiate the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity, or IPEF.
It was launched by the US to counter China's influence in the region.
Though an agreement on trade has not been reached, there's been progress in other areas, such as clean energy and fair economy.
So given these developments, what does this mean for the US's influence and leadership in the Indo-pacific?
And how will this US-led initiative affect Japan and other countries in the region?
Well, these are some of the questions I'm going to put to Michael Froman, a former US trade representative,
who's currently the president of the Council on Foreign Relations - and I'm meeting him right here at his headquarters in New York.
Welcome back to the program. Ambassador Froman, great to have you with us again.
Great to be here.
So, if you can just explain to us what is the significance of IPEF for the US and other countries in the Indo-Pacific region?
Well, I think most importantly, IPEF is a concrete manifestation
that the US is committed to being engaged and in showing leadership in the Asia-Pacific region,
which is arguably the most important region in the world for its economic future.
And so, it's very important in that regard.
Now, there are different pillars, there's different lines of work that are happening under the IPEF umbrella.
But even separate from the specifics of IPEF,
just the fact that the US is there with 13 other countries, working together, creating habits of cooperation.
That itself is an important contribution to the architecture of the Asia-Pacific.
You are former trade representative, so you've had firsthand experience in leading trade negotiations, specifically the Trans-Pacific Partnership,
which is, of course, a free trade pact with Asia that was signed in 2016 and then it was abandoned by the Trump administration.
Tell us a little bit about how the US has strategy in the Asia-Pacific region has changed over the years?
Well, on one hand I think the US has really doubled down in its commitment to the Asia-Pacific region or the Indo-Pacific region, perhaps.
The QUAD with Japan, Australia, India, the United States is an increasingly active organization focusing on more and more issues.
AUKUS between the US, the UK and Australia as a form of strategic cooperation is another.
The work that the US has done with Japan and South Korea, the trilateral summit at Camp David.
I think that's been an important contribution.
And so, there's been a real doubling down on the importance of this.
Even while there are wars in Europe, there are wars in the Middle East, there are challenges elsewhere around the world.
This in some ways represents that rebalancing that to Asia that President Obama first talked about.
It's not at the expense of the rest of the world. It's just a recognition that the Asia-Pacific region is so important to the US
that we need to be deeply engaged there in all dimensions; military, political and economic.
Let's talk a little bit more about the TPP, because that was really your signature agreement.
I mean, it had a huge impact when it was there.
How significant was the TPP?
Well, I think it was a quite a significant and a concrete example of the US commitment to be engaged economically in the region.
And I continue to believe that the US pulling out of TPP will be viewed historically
as one of the most significant strategic blunders in American, in recent American history.
What impact do you think the Trump presidency in rule between 2017 to 2021 has had on US interests in the Indo-Pacific region?
Well, I think the pull-out sent a very negative signal about our commitment
and our longevity and the reliability of our commitment to the region.
I think the Trump administration did very much focus on the US-China relationship
and things that could be done to put that on better footing.
And I think they raised the understanding of, the awareness of,
the concerns about how China was pursuing its economic interests globally.
And I think that led both to broad consensus in the United States,
but also increasing agreement between the United States and its allies.
But do you believe that that decision to pull out of the TPP and just the Trump,
I guess, foreign policy, did it set back the US's efforts in the Indo-Pacific?
Well, I think pulling out of TPP certainly did.
And I think that's one reason why the Biden administration has tried to find ways of engaging with the region,
both from a military strategic point of view, but also from an economic point of view,
because our friends and partners in the region, the more China asserts itself as a regional power.
And, of course, it's got a magnetic effect. It is the largest economy in Asia.
It's been the largest economy there for 13 of the last 15 centuries.
It is going to be a dominant player there.
But the more of a role they play across the region, the more our allies and partners want us also there
to help balance, to hedge their bets, to diversify their partnerships.
And so, I think it's vitally important that the US play that role as well.
But China has, you know, the Belt and Road Initiative, which it launched in 2013.
It's continued to promote quite heavily.
It has its challenges, but it's still supported by a lot of countries.
China says it has more than 150 countries that support its Belt and Road initiative.
Can you just tell us, how significant is the Belt and Road Initiative and what type of influence or impact does it have globally?
Well, I think it's a very significant and strategic initiative by China to use its considerable financial resources
and its resources in terms of construction and infrastructure build, to extend its influence.
I think what we've seen over the last few years, though,
is that the way in which it's been conducted has elicited a lot of push-back by people in the region, as well.
As they saw that these highways or ports or airports came with a lot of debt and that burdened the countries.
And if the countries couldn't pay the debt, then China would come in and take possession and ownership of the infrastructure assets.
So suddenly strategic infrastructure in these countries was now being owned by China, and that has elicited a very negative reaction.
So, I think on one hand, for the countries who participate,
there is a potential positive in getting significant investment in infrastructure, which many of the countries need.
But I think it's very important that they if they're going to participate, they do so
in a way that ensures that it's in their interest.
In terms of the cost, that they actually need, that infrastructure, that the cost is appropriate, that is being financed appropriate,
and that it's not actually creating an unsustainable economic burden on the country that could ultimately have political ramifications as well.
How does China's Belt and Road Initiative effect, I guess, the US's strategic interests and influence in the Asia-Pacific region?
I think it's one way in which China tries to extend its influence around the world.
The US has other ways too.
The US, I think, continues to be the leading beacon around the world.
If you're growing up in whether it's in India or Singapore or Vietnam, you want to send your child to university in the United States.
Because we have the best university system in the world.
If you're an entrepreneur, you want to partner with venture capitalists in the United States
because we have the best risk capital ecosystem in the world and the best R&D in our universities and in our private sector.
And so those, I think, are great strengths for us.
Not to mention popular culture and all the other elements that the people around the world tend to look to the US for.
Now, what it has pointed out is that the US needs to be in the game as well.
And it has pursued now some global infrastructure initiatives.
It's reformed some of its own institutions like the International Development Finance Corporation,
so that it too, could play a role in financing important strategic investments in countries around the world.
But frankly, the US is unlikely to ever be able to match China dollar for dollar in that regard.
And I don't think it needs to. I think it has other assets at its disposal, including all those things I mentioned
that make it a very attractive partner for countries around the world.
And I think that's how it needs to find ways of leveraging those assets in order to extend its influence.
What do you think will be the merit for the United States to actually lead countries in the Indo-Pacific region?
I think because this region is so important to our economic well-being and to our broader security and political interests.
It's vitally important that we're there, that we're engaged, and that we're showing leadership.
The fact that the countries in the region themselves wanted so badly and they don't want just a military commitment.
As you travel around the region, the one thing you get a deep sense of
is just how economic the region is, how much everybody is focused on trade.
The US being a very large, continental wide economy, only about 20-22% of our economy is related to trade, imports and exports.
In Europe, it's about 50%. In Southeast Asia at 70%.
So, people breathe, live, trade, economic integration in the region, and they want the US to be part of that as well.
What about some of the countries that maybe are on the fence, or that believe in having multi alignment with not just the US.
As a close ally to the region, what role do you think Japan can play?
Well, I think I think Japan has a vitally important role and the changes we've seen in Japan over the last decade or so
in terms of its willingness to show leadership on issues like trade, but also its commitment to security in the region,
its diplomatic work with countries like Korea to try and resolve historic issues.
I think all show that Japan is a major player in the region and in the world, part of the G7 and the G20 and otherwise.
But I think it's less about maintaining a US centric world order than in figuring out what this new period is really all about.
And, you know, sometimes a country will be allied with the US, sometimes it might be allied with a rival of the US for its own national interests.
I think we have very close partners with our military allies, including Japan.
There are other countries who, I imagine, will have good relations with us,
could have relations with good relations with China, might have relations with other countries as well.
And we just have to get used to the complexity of what the international system is likely to look like going forward.
Over the course of the next year as we head into a US presidential election in November 2024.
What impact do you think the politics and the campaigning is going to have on the Biden administration's policy towards Asia?
How's that going to affect that?
Historically, foreign policy has not played a particular central role in in our elections.
It's more been around what we call pocketbook issues or kitchen table issues, the economic issues.
Do you feel better economically now than you did before?
I think this may be a little bit of a different election because we're having a debate about Ukraine.
We're having a debate about the Middle East.
And while there's a consensus on China, the relationship between those pocketbook issues
and how we're managing our relationship with China is pretty close.
And so, I think the politics in the United States right now is that each candidate, and each party, and each member of Congress,
I think, has an incentive to be as firm as possible vis a vis China.
So, I think the effect is likely to be to reinforce a very firm stance.
How do you see the effect or the influence any of this sort of campaigning and politics could have on trade,
particularly not just with China, but with the Indo-Pacific region in the coming year?
I think campaign years are not necessarily great years to try and reach international agreements.
I think people are really domestically focused largely.
I think depending on the nature of the campaign, and to what degree coming out of this campaign,
the US is positioned to remain engaged with allies, as the Biden administration has done, to play a leadership role in the international system.
Or to what degree the results of the campaign, if the country wants to turn inward, to withdraw.
It's become more isolationist, more protectionist.
I think we may see elements of that during the campaign and we'll see how it plays out over the course of the election.
Ambassador Froman, thank you so much for joining us again on the show.
Thanks for having me.
Given recent global developments, such a tension in the South China sea,
the strategic implications of US trade policy in Asia have rarely been clearer.
Washington' s commitment to trade and development in Asia sends a signal to allies and rivals alike
on whether the US is truly a reliable partner in the region.
I'm Del Irani, thanks for your company.
I'll see you next time on DEEPER LOOK.