Hello and welcome to DEEPER LOOK.

I'm Del Irani, it's great to have your company.

In recent weeks, the US and Chinese military forces have come uncomfortably close.

First, the Pentagon says this Chinese military jet performed an "unnecessarily aggressive" maneuver

near a US military plane in the South China Sea.

And then, the US Navy claims a Chinese warship cut in front of one of it's destroyers in the Taiwan Strait.

Despite these encounters, earlier in May there were two high-level meetings between the US and China.

So where do relations between the two countries currently stand?

Where are they headed and how will this impact allies in the Indo-Pacific region?

Joining me now to talk more about this is former American diplomat Richard Haass,

the president of the Council on Foreign Relations, and a veteran of four presidential administrations.

Richard Haass, welcome to the program. Great to have you with us.

Great to be back.

So, you know, Richard, you said a couple of months ago

that the relationship between the US and China is the worst it's been

since this relationship was established about 40 years ago.

Do you still feel that's the case, and why?

Even more so!

The two countries are really having a difficult time in finding a formula.

If you take a, let's say take a slight step back, historically,

United States and China first began to cooperate during the Cold War against the Soviet Union.

And then once the Cold War ended three decades ago, the two countries found that economics brought them together.

Increasingly though, economics divide them.

It's become another source of friction, obviously, very different political systems.

Obviously, also, China is rising, militarily becoming much more assertive.

And the two countries, again, are searching for a way to almost, as we would say, a modus vivendi,

how to live with one another, what ought to be the ground rules,

and they can't find the floor yet in the relationship.

So then, not only not cooperating, but in many ways, increasingly,

this is a relationship defined by differences and by friction.

The Chinese have recently, you know, rejected numerous attempts by the US Secretary of Defense to meet his Chinese counterpart.

They did meet briefly at the Shangri La dialogue, they shook hands, they did the photos.

But I want to contrast it with two high level meetings between the US and China earlier in May.

So, we're kind of getting some mixed signals here.

I mean, what's going on? What's your take?

I think you're exactly right to see the differences.

We've had meetings on the economic side, the Secretary of Commerce from the United States,

Gina Raimondo meeting with her Chinese counterpart,

there's talk now that the Secretary of State's trip to Beijing will be back on.

So diplomatically and economically, we seem to be talking a bit.

Not militarily - why?

I believe the Chinese value most the economic interaction.

They want to see that, if possible, expand it, they certainly don't want it to contract more.

But, I also believe they don't want to reassure us militarily.

I actually believe, you know, if we see what they're doing with their flights, what we see they're doing with their warships,

the Chinese want to raise the temperature, want to increase the sense of risk or uncertainty

because they're hoping that gets the United States to perhaps pull back.

So, I think what seems to be inconsistent, is actually quite concerted.

There's been lack of dialogue.

There's been military maneuver mix-ups, you've got tensions over Taiwan,

and of course, you know, China's close relationship with Russia.

How serious is the security situation right now?

And what role can the US play in de-escalating the tensions?

Well, it's serious, but we're not in a crisis.

I don't believe a crisis, much less a conflict would serve the interests of either country, either China or the United States.

So, I do not, repeat not, think that anything bad or terrible over Taiwan or anything else is imminent.

In the case of the most pressing situation, which is not Taiwan, but which is Ukraine.

The Chinese, as best we can tell, while they're buying energy from Russia, they are not providing arms.

So, the real question going forward is can again, we find some area potentially of limited cooperation,

Ukraine is the most pressing possibility.

Taiwan; no one's looking to solve.

The question is simply can't we continue to find a way... how would I put it...

to agree to disagree that we don't have any solution.

But we've managed for nearly half a century to live with our differences.

Can we extend that?

One of the things you said is that the Chinese really value the trade and economic relationship?

How are the military tensions, if any, impacting trade ties between the US and China?

Well, for decades, the United States, and this went across administrations,

thought the trade would bring about what you might describe as a mellowing or moderating of Chinese power and behavior.

It didn't work that way.

China entered the World Trade Organization two decades ago.

And what's happened is not what a lot of the advocates of that thought.

China, if anything, is more repressive at home,

a larger and not a smaller state role in the economy, obviously much more capable militarily.

So, what we now have is a much more skeptical view of trade.

A lot of it's okay, a lot of it is, if you will, purely civilian.

But trade that continues to contribute to Chinese competitiveness,

trade that transfers technology to China, trade that could have strategic consequences.

Increasingly, that's out of the question.

And what you're going to see is less Chinese access to American technology that could have such uses

and less willingness on our part to give a green light to approve technology going to China.

So, it's going to become a more narrow relationship.

The US has coined a new approach to China.

They said we're not decoupling, but we are "de-risking."

This was endorsed by the G7 leaders at the summit in Hiroshima.

Can you explain to us what is this de-risking strategy?

How does it work? Where's does this term come from?

Well, there's no possibility, then it's not desirable for the two countries to decouple.

That's too dramatic.

The de-risking phrase essentially means we're not going to allow things to go back and forth

that have security or significant economic competitiveness consequences.

So again, I like the word narrowing, or the word distancing.

But the idea is the same.

Let's put controls mostly on the technology sphere.

But let's allow non-technology centric trade to go forward.

When we're talking about the security situation and de-escalating tensions,

what do you think the US's approach should be when it comes to the issue of Taiwan?

Well, I believe we ought not to change the basics of the policy, they've worked for half a century.

So, we ought to continue to stick by the so-called One-China policy.

We have to understand China's position on that, we ought to oppose Taiwan's independence.

But also, we ought to be very, very explicit,

that we will oppose any Chinese use of force, any use of coercion to change the status quo.

We don't want to have a conflict.

Our position should be to deter one.

What we... Look, to put in another way.

I'm a realist. We cannot change Chinese aspirations or dreams about Taiwan.

They've made those clear. What they see as rejuvenation.

Taiwan, they've made clear is central to their vision of their own future.

We can't change that.

What we can change, what we can influence is Chinese behavior, or their choices, or what they actually do.

And what we want them to do is to essentially understand that the risks and costs of acting coercively, using military force.

The costs would be far greater than any conceivable benefits that would accrue to them.

That's called deterrence.

So, what we and Japan and Taiwan and others need to do is essentially put the capabilities and the arrangements in place.

So, anyone looking from Beijing at Taiwan would say,

as much as I want to do something, it would be ill-advised to do anything.

That's what we can do.

Richard Haass, in your book, "The World: A Brief Introduction,"

you discuss the concept of competitive coexistence between the US and China.

If you were sitting in the White House right now, and you were advising the Biden administration,

what would you be telling them in regards to their strategy towards China?

I mean, did you agree with their approach?

Do you agree with the way they're tackling issues?

What should they be doing differently?

Just one point analytically, what's interesting to me as an observer

is how similar the Biden policy to China is to the Trump policy towards China.

And what I think this says, and people should understand this,

is there has been a very fundamental change across the political spectrum.

That China is viewed much more skeptically by Democrats and Republicans alike.

People are much more wary of the economic relationship.

The hope had been that it would transform China.

That hasn't happened.

So, the first thing to acknowledge is that a tougher, more skeptical relationship with China is probably here to stay.

And I think that's understood.

What I would probably change in a couple of things is; one, I would have more regular diplomacy.

We ought to be having regular consultations between President Biden and President Xi Jinping,

between Jake Sullivan or Tony Blinken and Wang Yi, or the foreign minister.

We ought to be talking about the big regional and global issues.

Diplomacy is not a favor.

And when things go badly, for example, the balloon incident.

Rather than cancelling the Secretary's trip or postponing it, I would have said go ahead with it.

When the tensions are higher, you have more reason to have diplomacy.

Another big area, I disagree with both administrations,

both the Biden and the Trump administration, is the lack of an economic policy.

The United States ought to be a participant, we ought to be a member in what was TPP,

the Trans-Pacific Partnership, that regional economic grouping.

It is ridiculous that we helped to design it.

And now, we are not a participant in it.

It is bad for us economically, it is bad for us strategically.

What role do you see Japan, a key US ally in the region, playing when it comes to kind of de-escalating tensions,

especially given the fact that China refuses to meet its defense counterparts in the US?

Actually, I think Japan is central.

And that is probably an underestimated factor in the future of this region and in the US-Chinese relationship.

Japan as it becomes more capable militarily, as it's more willing to contemplate the use of its military might.

Its involvement, say, in possible contingency planning for Taiwan and so forth.

That would help deter a crisis.

And then I also think greater involvement of Japan economically.

How do we reduce our collective dependence on China so China can't use leverage against us?

How do we make sure we have common rules on technology reaching China?

But no, I want Japan to be, if anything, a full-fledged participant in our diplomacy, our economics, our military planning.

And I actually would argue that one of the most significant changes in international relations of the last decade

is the emergence of a more capable and a more active Japan and the region in the world.

The US and Japan are very united as a strong alliance.

However, as a diplomat, you know, you would, you'd be privy to some more detail and analysis on this,

sort of share your insight.

So where are some key points in which these two countries may diverge on their interests?

And have differences of opinion?

Well, I mean, for example, China, what we've been talking about is, there's always tactical differences.

And the United States is often more confrontational,

I believe, with China, than Japan has been willing to, I think, over the years, but the gap has almost disappeared.

The United States wanted Japan and the Republic of Korea, South Korea to get closer.

Again, I think that's been an extraordinary diplomatic accomplishment.

And if I were going to take a step back and say, what are the most important bilateral relationships we have in the world?

Obviously, there are some in Europe, the United States and the UK, or Germany, or what have you.

But I would say the US-Japan relationship is second to none.

Just going back to the US and China.

Ultimately, you know, they have very different visions of the international world order.

How you reconcile these differing ideas of the international world order,

and possibly ways for these two countries to work together to foster a more cooperative global system?

It's a good question.

I would stop talking about democracy as the center or as the central theme of world order.

China is many things. It is not democratic. It is not about to be.

What we have to do is learn to work together in limited areas, despite our fundamentally different social and political systems.

I would hope we could agree to work on some regional issues.

One where China has been quite disappointing has been North Korea.

They've not used their leverage to influence the trajectory of North Korea's missile or nuclear programs.

Obviously, that the United States and China could potentially even coordinate.

I am open to the idea.

I've recently written in a Foreign Affairs magazine,

that the United States and China should potentially work together to bring about a ceasefire and,

one day even a peace between Russia and Ukraine.

My goal is not to exclude China, from important international undertakings,

if China's willing and able to play a constructive role.

They certainly could play a constructive role with Ukraine.

They put out some principles on peace.

My view is let's test them on that.

But given China's close friendship with Russia,

I mean, can China be trusted to work together with the US and bring peace?

As Ronald Reagan once said, "Trust but verify."

The answer is, look, you have a close relationship with Russia, that potentially gives you leverage.

We don't have a, needless to say, much of any relationship with Russia.

So, the real question with China is, are you prepared to use your influence with Russia?

I would say let's see, let's test it, let's explore.

Again, the goal should never be simply to exclude China.

The goal should be to bring China and to work with them where we can usefully - whether it's on global issues,

some people talk about climate change, or regional issues like North Korea,

or what's going on between Ukraine and Russia.

We'll see. I'm a realist.

But my view is let's at least be open to the possibility.

We're not doing well this way.

The situation - all the areas I've just mentioned,

whether it's climate, or North Korea, or the war in Ukraine, the current situations are not good.

They are not getting better.

We ought to be open to working with China.

Some fantastic advice there.

Richard Haass, thank you so much for joining us on the program.

Thanks for having me.

Rising tensions between the US and China are a serious concern for all of us.

As the world's two superpowers jostle for influence and control,

stepping up efforts to avoid a major conflict between these two nations

is becoming more complex, but more crucial by the day.

Join us next time as we continue our conversation with Richard Haass on DEEPER LOOK.

I'm Del Irani, thanks for your company.

I'll see you then!