China's Foreign Policy Under President Xi: Daniel Russel / Vice President, Asia Society Policy Institute

Hello and welcome to DEEPER LOOK from New York.

I'm Del Irani, it's great to have your company.

Now that Chinese President Xi Jinping has secured an historic 3rd term and stacked his Politburo with loyalists...

What are the implications of this new leadership, for the world?

During the last ten years of President Xi's rule, there was a notable change in China's diplomatic style from "hide your strength and bide your time..."

To more aggressive diplomacy - backed by strong Chinese economic growth and growing military power.

Additionally, in recent years, relations between the U.S & China have worsened.

So, how should the world prepare for President Xi's rule over the next 5 years?

And, what will his tightening grip on power mean for the future of Chinese foreign policy?

Joining me once again to talk more about this is Daniel Russel.

He served as Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs.

He also helped formulate President Obama's strategic rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region, as Special Assistant to the President for Asian affairs.

Currently, he's the Vice President at the Asia Society Policy Institute.

And he joins me once more— Welcome back to the program to Mr. Russel, great to have you with us again.

Thanks for having me, Del.

So just talking about the China's Party Congress, how will China's foreign policy change after this very important meeting?

I think unfortunately, there's no reason to think that China's external policies are going to change in Xi Jinping's third term, or at least not changed for the better.

I think all the indicators are that Xi Jinping is really doubling down on a tough and assertive stance, not only towards its neighbors, but importantly, a tough stance towards the West.

Not only using the West as a scapegoat, as the justification for cracking down at home, but also really trying to undermine and contest the rules-based order that Western countries,

including Japan have championed over the last several decades.

Maybe Xi Jinping would rather be feared than loved.

He's not really going to a lot of trouble to reassure countries around the region.

Certainly their Chinese policy involves a co-option and inducements through economic and financial means, but fundamentally, it's more about muscle.

On that point, I guess the term "it's more about muscle," one of the most, sort of remarkable things in President Xi's opening speech at the Congress,

was that he made some remarks about Taiwan.

Can you explain to us what's the feeling in China in the country, and then in the Party towards this issue?

Do you expect to see any policy change on this?

No, I definitely do not expect, and none of us should expect to see a policy change.

I think the question is, how much risk is the Chinese leadership prepared to assume?

And, how much urgency do they feel in the effort to achieve what they've set as a national goal, as a critical element of what they call the "rejuvenation of the great Chinese nation,"

in other words, subjugating Taiwan.

Xi Jinping's number one priority is not being the leader who lost Taiwan.

That what he fears is a crisis in which Taiwan effectively declares independence, that the United States abandons the One-China policy and recognizes Taiwan.

Were that to happen, I think there's no question that China would use its military to try to prevent that.

But apart from that, I read the indicators as meaning that Beijing is more likely to act like a boa constrictor, and try to squeeze Taiwan into submission, then act like a rattlesnake and, you know, attack with military force.

The idea of winning without fighting is deeply embedded in Chinese strategy from many centuries ago.

I think that's probably the strategy.

And so, to the extent that Xi Jinping feels that the status quo isn't being challenged, he may be willing to move more slowly.

Can you tell us, what do you think about this, this kind of confrontation we're seeing at the moment between US and China?

What's the future of it? Is this what we should expect moving forward?

Or do you see the tensions kind of dying down a little bit?

I wish there was a basis for predicting the tensions would die down, although that's certainly everybody's hope.

I, myself, having worked for many years on US-China relations, I'm deeply worried.

Negative attitudes, really tremendously negative, almost hostile attitudes, have hardened on both sides.

China's rise, it's not intrinsically a bad thing.

It's not something that the United States opposes.

A stable and growing China is a good thing for the world, to the extent that Chinese behavior is consistent with international law, with universal norms, and rights and so on.

But in US-China relations right now, there is virtually no real communication, there's very little dialogue.

And although both sides say that they want to cooperate, both sides seem to find it nearly impossible to actually cooperate in the current political atmosphere.

This is a volatile situation and environment where even just a spark could start a dangerous fire.

You were at the White House as a, you know, special assistant on Asia-Pacific Affairs to the President, what would you be advising them in terms of strategies of how to deal with China?

Well, I work directly with and under, then Vice President Biden.

I know, his senior officials very, very well.

These are friends and former colleagues of mine.

A lot of the difficulty that we're facing, though, frankly, is the function of the conceit in Beijing that the wind is at China's back,

the East is rising, and the West is in terminal decay.

This notion that China now can take an arrogant approach, can dictate to the world, can reshape global governance -

this is very dangerous, and it is the United States that has frequently proposed dialogues, it's the United States that urged the two sides reach what President Biden calls

"guardrails, safeguards" against some accident or inadvertent incident that could precipitate a crisis that could then lead to conflict.

And it's the Chinese side that thus far has brushed these off.

It's dismissed it.

Now, in terms of advice, look, we need communication.

And until the Party Congress that had just transpired, our interlocutors were largely unwilling to engage in what the American side considered to be sincere or constructive talks.

We should all hope that the new lineup after the Party Congress creates more space in China, for the Chinese side to engage, constructively, practically with the US.

I want to just briefly talk about Russia because Russian President Vladimir Putin released statements congratulating President Xi, saying that he "looks forward to further developing a comprehensive partnership between the two countries," between Russia and China.

How concerned should countries in the Asia-Pacific be about the friendship between Russia and China, and, what impact could this have on the Asia-Pacific region?

What we're seeing, frankly, now is Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping, both trying to create spheres of influence,

that have the effect of trying to keep the United States out of the region.

They're working to discredit democracy.

They're working to rewrite even the definition of human rights, and erase things like freedom of speech, freedom of religion, and so on.

So, I think that Sino-Russian cooperation really does pose a serious threat, certainly to the interests of democratic countries,

and, I would argue, challenging the international system.

We're seeing China support Russia in these horribly hypocritical efforts in the UN Security Council.

For example, on the one hand, to blame the Ukraine, blame Ukraine for things that Russia should be held accountable for,

but at the same time to defend and protect Kim Jong-Un and the North Koreans rather than hold them accountable for their egregious violations of international law.

Does Xi Jinping have any vulnerabilities?

One is that he's creating a dictator bubble, by surrounding himself with yes-men and loyalists, so he can't, he's not going to get and probably doesn't already get accurate information,

and certainly doesn't get a lot of bad news.

But secondly, you know, he's putting himself in charge of everything.

And sooner or later, you know, that means that he's going to be held responsible for decisions, right? He is in charge.

He is, you know, the emperor.

Right now, he's using the scapegoat of, you know, a hostile US policy and so on.

But I think that already, there are people in Beijing who are asking, you know, hasn't he been a little too aggressive internationally?

Wasn't it premature to drop the "hide-and-bide strategy" and challenge the West?

So, it's far from clear that he can pull off an extended balancing act here.

What's your advice to countries in the Asia-Pacific region?

I mean, how do they prepare for this, you know, foreign policy that's going to emerge out of China,

and for this, perhaps more assertive China in the coming years?

Well, look, I think we're already seeing some degree of "bandwagoning," as it's called.

That the more threatening China's posture becomes, the greater the incentive there is for other countries, for smaller countries, to find ways to work together.

Some of it is directly in terms of mutual defense.

But at the same time, though, I think nearly all the countries in the Indo-Pacific understand that they also need to maintain open lines of communication with Beijing.

You know, there's not a country that I know of in the region, who doesn't want to have it both ways, so to speak.

Who wants to get the benefits of trade and engagement with China, without the downsides.

Countries don't want to choose one side or the other.

They're on their own side. They're looking out for their own interests.

And I think their own interests are for a balanced set of relationships.

And I think, frankly, in the long term, it is in the interest of China, and, in the interest of the United States, to find ways, a modus vivendi, to coexist.

After all, we're all marooned on this small planet together.

And, our common interest is not in capitulation, not in surrender.

The US-Japan should continue to defend universal law, but in finding some ways to peacefully coexist.

Mr. Russell, really appreciate you joining us once again on the program.

My pleasure, Del. Thank you so much.

China's economic and geopolitical strength is both a threat and an opportunity for the world, but most especially Asia-Pacific countries.

On the economic front, there are lucrative trade and business opportunities...

But China's geopolitical ambitions can pose a national security threat to nations in the region...

So dealing with China is complicated and when trying to build a relationship - it means that nations could have a partner, competitor, and challenger all at the same time.

I'm Del Irani, thanks for your company.

I'll see you next time!