US and Asian Allies' Strategy Toward North Korea: Bruce Klingner / Senior Research Fellow, Heritage Foundation

Hello and welcome to DEEPER LOOK from New York.

I'm Del Irani, it's great to have your company.

At UN General Assembly this year, world leaders have been preoccupied with threats of nuclear retaliation by Russian President Vladmir Putin.

But in the Asia-pacific region, there's another country that's been furthering its nuclear ambitions for years...

North Korea.

There are concerns that North Korea may conduct its seventh nuclear test, in the coming months.

Earlier this year, the country test-launched nuclear-capable ballistic missiles believed to be able to reach as far as the United States.

So, what is the US strategy for denuclearizing North Korea?

And how should countries in the region - such as Japan and South Korea respond?

Joining me now to talk more about this is Bruce Klingner.

He's a senior research fellow at the Heritage Foundation specializing in Korean and Japanese affairs.

He spent 20 years with the CIA and the defense and intelligence agency, where he followed North Korea's nuclear arms development.

Welcome to the program Mr. Klingner. Great to have you with us.

Well, thank you for having me.

So North Korea seems ready to conduct its next nuclear test.

And it's already launched a series of ballistic and cruise missiles this year.

How worried should we be about North Korea's nuclear ambitions?

We should be very concerned as we have been for a number of years.

It's always uncertain the extent of the nuclear and missile arsenal and their capabilities.

But back in 2017, the US intelligence community assessed that North Korea had 30 to 60 nuclear weapons or weapons worth of fissile material

with a capability of building an additional five to 12 per year.

So, by 2027, they could have 200 nuclear weapons or weapons worth of material.

And we know their ICBMs can reach the entire continental United States.

And they have missiles which can reach all of Japan as well as South Korea.

Given the gravity of the situation, what you described in terms of the capacity of the nuclear warheads, and the fact that there has been so much testing.

We've also seen North Korea's leader Kim Jong-Un say that he's not open to discussing denuclearization.

Why do you think Kim Jong Un's taking such a strong stance on this issue?

And you know, really, really saying we're not going to, we're not going to discuss denuclearization at all?

Well, there's actually a great deal more continuity than change in not only the recently enacted nuclear law, but also statements by Kim during that meeting and earlier this year.

So, they really mimic statements that the North Korean leadership has been making for decades.

Back in 2006 a North Korean official said, why would we test nuclear weapons just to give them up?

And there's a long list of statements by North Korea that, "we will never give up our nuclear weapons, to think we would is a delusion, that it is foolish etc., We would never trade them for economic benefits."

So, I think it's more continuity.

Also, his statements this year, some interpreted as a new more offensive strategy for their nuclear weapons even including pre-emptive attacks.

But again, they've been making those kinds of statements for at least a decade.

So, they've often emphasized the defensive or deterrent mission for their nuclear forces, but at the same time, concurrently issuing a lot of pre-emptive threat statements

against attacks, against the United States as well as Japan and South Korea.

So, then what exactly is the US strategy towards North Korea?

What is the Biden administration thinking in terms of how they deal with Kim Jong Un and these clearly, this rhetoric?

The Biden administration sort of partially unveiled its strategy last year, and when we've pressed for details, they said they would like to first engage with North Korea

to reveal the details during negotiations, rather than through the media or through pundits.

But it's a lot of similarities to previous policies.

They have emphasized that any kind of denuclearization agreement would be incremental, rather than the perception under the Trump administration,

that it would have to be North Korea do everything before they received any kind of benefits.

So, it would be action-for-action and incremental.

It would take time, a several year process.

Because there has been no diplomatic engagement between Washington and North Korea since the October 2019 meetings under the Trump administration,

we really don't know what the parameters of an acceptable agreement would be for the Biden administration.

There are many recommendations, but we're not sure what the Biden administration would be willing to accept.

We've had eight international agreements with North Korea on denuclearization.

All have failed.

That's not to say we don't try for a ninth.

But hopefully we learn from the lessons of the past.

But I think there's less and less optimism that we can get North Korea to denuclearize, and more likely that it's a long-term threat that we will have to deal with.

And we have to defend against it while continuing diplomatic efforts.

But Pyongyang has repeatedly said they have no interest in having meetings.

What are some of the lessons that the US can learn from past mistakes?

I mean, what can they do differently moving forward?

Well, I think some of the differences you can compare with how the arms control treaties with the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact were created.

Those were very detailed, very extensive, and included very rigorous verification protocols.

All of the agreements with North Korea have been very short, very vague, simply in the interest of getting an agreement, hoping that it would lead to more detailed agreements, though they didn't.

So, there were loopholes or differing interpretations of what was agreed to.

So, accusations of cheating in North Korea would say no, we haven't, because we have a different interpretation.

So, we had some verification, but certainly not the extent that we had in with the Soviet Union, where the agreements were 100 or more pages long.

Those with North Korea have often been two or three pages.

At the UN General Assembly, the Japanese Prime Minister Kishida said he's willing to visit North Korea for talks.

How significant is that gesture?

And do you think that it could make a difference?

I think it's significant, though, I would assume there's a lot of conditionality in that statement, and that before the prime minister met with the North Korean leader, whether in North Korea or in a third country.

I think there would be a lot of negotiating as to what topics would be covered.

The US tried summit diplomacy.

It didn't get us any further than other efforts.

And so far, the Biden administration has said it will go back to traditional US diplomacy where we'll save summit meetings for either an agreement or to break logjams.

As opposed to preliminary negotiations, which Washington now feels, as it did before, that it should be done at the working level through extensive meetings.

In South Korea, it's been a bit of a different approach.

You've got the... they've begun joint military drills with the US after the USS Ronald Reagan, which is the aircraft carrier visited the country, first time since 2017.

When North Korea is watching this, and they're seeing these joint military drills happening between the US and South Korea, how do you think this is affecting the situation and North Korea's posture towards the nuclear program?

Is it helping or is it kind of adding to the aggression?

Well, I'd turned the issue around and say that during the last four years when we cancelled and constrained and reduced numerous, both combined as well as unilateral military exercises,

we gained nothing in return from North Korea.

Either in its military posture, or diplomatic progress.

So, President Trump announced in 2018, he was canceling these exercises.

We got nothing in return, except for years of degrading our own deterrence and defense capability.

So, North Korea continued its winter training cycle at summer training cycle, it didn't make any additional gesture.

So, now under new leadership in Washington and Seoul, we're resuming these exercises to repair really the damage of the last four years.

So, it's to defend our nations and our citizens by having stronger more robust deterrence capability.

So, North Korea will blame those exercises for its actions, which would have taken anyway.

Let's talk about China.

What role can China play when it comes to somewhat helping, you know, North Korea with their denuclearization process, if that was to ever happen?

Well, in the past, we thought that the road to Pyongyang went through Beijing.

But what we've seen is repeatedly China is more a part of the problem than the solution.

In the UN Security Council, they've repeatedly acted like North Korea's lawyer, they've denied evidence, they've watered down resolutions, they blocked new resolutions.

And we know the regime is turning a blind eye to sanctions violations being carried out by Chinese banks, businesses and shipping companies.

So, even though we know that they would likely prevent a yet another resolution, after a seventh nuclear test.

There's still a lot that can be done to enforce existing resolutions as well as US and international law that that Washington and other nations have seemingly been reluctant to do.

We've announced in 2018, President Trump said there were 300 North Korean entities, that would be violating US law on US soil in the US financial system, that he had decided not to sanction.

And we have not yet sanction them.

Also, a number of Chinese banks that are violating US law, we've taken no action again.

So, there are more things we can do.

If nothing else, to enforce our own laws and protect our financial system.

So, if China can't play a role, and you've got other countries, you know, US allies that of course, are working with the US to increase the defenses.

What is the best way forward?

I mean, how do you negotiate with a country that doesn't appear to want to be negotiating?

Well, you can lead a horse to water, but I guess you can't make them negotiate.

So, the US has repeatedly made efforts and treaties for dialogue, let alone negotiations.

Not only during the Biden administration, but previous administrations.

Some have argued instead of denuclearization talks, we should have arms control, or tension reduction, or conventional force reduction.

All of those have merit, but they all require a partner willing to sit in the same room with you.

So, as long as North Korea refuses to do that, we do have to maintain our law enforcement and our military measures.

So, the US, I think, has properly repeatedly indicated that we're willing to have negotiations, we're willing to have talks, but North Korea has rejected those.

Now, in the past, sometimes the road to negotiations has first gone through a crisis.

So, after North Korea's first nuclear test in 2006, three weeks later, they said they're willing to have talks.

So, we may have to go through that that process again with the seventh nuclear tests.

What about some of the sanctions the US and the West have imposed on North Korea?

North Korea has somewhat indicated that perhaps if the sanctions were lifted or eased off, there may be some wiggle room.

What do you make of that?

In the past, they've also said that nothing will get them to give up their nuclear weapons, sanctions relief, economic benefits, reduction of military exercises, etc.

So, and there's a long, long list of their demands, including the US abrogate its treaties with Japan and South Korea, remove all forces west of Hawaii, etc.

So, again, the parameters of an agreement require having the two nations, as well as perhaps other nations in the room.

So, you know, sanctions, there's a lot of different kinds, and I think the UN sanctions are more negotiable.

They could be overturned by the UN Security Council.

They're mostly related to nuclear missile activity, and they constrain North Korean economic activity.

That's the kind of thing that can be negotiated.

If you're sitting in the Asia Pacific region, you have a neighbor like North Korea doing all these missile tests.

What's your advice to them?

What can they possibly do to help break the stalemate?

Well, there's a lot of pessimism about breaking the stalemate.

But as all three countries try to gain some kind of access to North Korea in talks, we have to improve the trilateral relationship and cooperation,

and particularly improving relations between Tokyo and Seoul.

You know, the Japanese export controls the South Korean Supreme Court ruling, the threat to remove itself from a military intelligence sharing agreement with Japan.

All of those are hurdles that need to be overcome, whether it's in an agreement amongst the two countries or sort of a series of steps.

They need to be done.

For example, South Korea refuses to integrate its missile defense system with the more comprehensive and effective US and Japanese system.

That's kind of like having three baseball outfielders not talking to each other, even though it increases the risk of dropping a fly ball or missing a missile.

Bruce Klingner, thank you so much for your time and insights.

Really great to have you on the program.

Thank you for having me.

Now, even recent world events such as the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the covid-19 pandemic have not deterred North Korea from furthering its nuclear program.

If anything, the country has hardened its resolve to become a nuclear-powered state.

Given this, it's even more important that countries like the US, South Korea, Japan and China work together to stop this development -

because it's in all our collective interests to do so.

I'm Del Irani, thanks for your company.

I'll see you next time!