How to Reduce the Threat of Nuclear Weapons: Rose Gottemoeller / Former Deputy Secretary General of NATO

Hello and welcome to DEEPER LOOK from New York.

I'm Del Irani, it's great to have your company.

As the conflict with Ukraine rages on, Russia has reminded us that nuclear weapons might be used in a war.

At the beginning of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, President Putin put Russia's nuclear weapons on "special combat readiness"

- suggesting he was considering their use.

That threat was reinforced by Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov at the end of April - after he warned the West not to underestimate the risks of nuclear conflict over Ukraine.

So, just how much of a threat is nuclear proliferation to the world?

And what can be done to stop it?

Joining me now to talk more about this is Rose Gottemoeller.

She is an American diplomat who served as Deputy Secretary General of NATO from 2016 to 2019.

She previously served as the Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security under the Obama administration.

She is currently a lecturer at Stanford University.

And she joins me now.

Rose Gottemoeller, welcome to the program.

Great to have you with us.

Thank you, great to be with you.

So, let me begin by asking you how significant were President Putin's moves at the beginning of the Russian invasion of Ukraine,

when he put Russia's nuclear forces on special combat readiness?

How seriously should we take this change in status?

I think we need to take the nuclear saber rattling very seriously.

It is a habit of Vladimir Putin's back in 2014 when he sees Crimea, we saw some nuclear saber rattling as well.

So, it is, it is dangerous rhetoric.

There's no question about it.

I do want to emphasize, however, that that special combat status actually is related to increasing the number of personnel that is in the Command-and-Control Centers for the nuclear forces.

It does not have to do with raising operational readiness of the missiles.

Now in 2009, you were selected by the US Secretary of State to negotiate a nuclear arms control deal with Russia.

So, you're very familiar with the ins and outs of the US and Russian arms control policy.

Given your level of expertise, what's your perspective?

How are you viewing the current conflict right now?

My own view is that we should be looking for ways to ensure that we do not actually end up in some kind of nuclear crisis.

And that should be the absolute top priority.

I think the American side has done well so far to insist that we would not raise the operational readiness of US nuclear forces,

and also to insist that there are things we can do, such as canceling the test of an ICBM that show,

we have no intention of moving to a nuclear level.

So, I would certainly urge more of that kind of restraint.

But furthermore, I'd look at what kind of tools we have available today to try to bolster that restraint and ensure we don't end up in a nuclear crisis.

For example, it's very quiet but the Russians have been continuing to implement the New START Treaty exchanging notifications about the movements of their strategic nuclear forces.

When they take an intercontinental ballistic missile, for example, and move it from one base to another, or take it to maintenance, then they notify the United States of that under the New START Treaty.

Of course, the United States does the same.

It's all reciprocal.

But it's this kind of predictability that is so important at this moment.

But given the fact that we've seen such a deterioration of the relationship between the two countries, is it still possible to move forward in this way and to have that openness and trust,

as you said, to have the nuclear inspections and the dialogue that's so important?

It's really important to remember that throughout the period after the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, the United States and Soviet Union, later the Russian Federation,

no matter how things went south, how bad they got, how the relations deteriorated, they always kept nuclear arms control and nuclear predictability

and confidence building risk reduction with regard to nuclear weapons as a strategic objective that should have to be maintained.

So, I'm hoping in that way, even with the terrible relations at the moment between Moscow and Washington, it could and should be possible to do some practical steps to reduce nuclear risks.

How are countries like Iran and North Korea, both nuclear armed countries, how are they viewing the situation?

And how, how concerned should we be that, you know, they might look to what Russia is doing and capitalize on it and build out their own nuclear programs even more.

We've seen a lot of testing from the North Koreans missile testing, and at the moment, we are also worried about a nuclear test out of North Korea.

So clearly, they have been very active in this area.

I do understand, although there have been some concerns expressed by the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna,

that the Iranians are not cooperating with inspectors and are not living up to their safeguards-agreements with the IAEA.

But nevertheless, I think there is some continuing willingness, as far as the Iranians are concerned to work on this negotiation.

The DPRK, the North Koreans, that's another matter.

You know, I think, almost there, there's more of a regional aspect to it.

They're trying to get the attention of the United States, perhaps to return to the negotiating table, and certainly to send some messages to the South Koreans,

because the South Koreans have a new and tougher government, But... and I want to underscore this, I am concerned about horizontal proliferation problems

emerging from this crisis in Ukraine, because a number of countries might take the lesson away, that this is a good time to start trying to acquire nuclear weapons, just in order to be able to defend themselves.

The Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons or NPT conference is going to be held later in August.

Can you tell us what is the significance of this conference?

And what role will Russia's invasion of Ukraine play at this meeting?

The Non-Proliferation Treaty was one of the great treaties that emerged out of the Cuban Missile Crisis.

It entered into force in 1972 10-years after the crisis.

And it was an amazing accomplishment because it did mean that as President Kennedy was worried back in the early 1960s,

he said we could have over 20 nuclear weapons states emerge onto the world stage.

But as a matter of fact, nowadays, we have five nuclear weapons states under the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

And we have Indian and Pakistan who do not belong to the treaty regime.

Then we have countries such as North Korea acquiring nuclear weapons outside the NPT.

Iran we are concerned about.

So, there is, I can say a real success story there that the Non-Proliferation Treaty really gave countries the confidence

not to have to pursue a nuclear weapons program.

And it's strange to think about it nowadays.

But back in the 1960s, there were nuclear weapons programs and countries as diverse as Switzerland, Sweden and Germany.

So, I think it is important that the treaty has played a role in non-proliferation, a very solid role in non-proliferation.

Nowadays, with the invasion of Ukraine, again, some countries may take the wrong lesson from that and think that they need to start acquiring nuclear weapons.

And that horizontal proliferation is of great concern.

It could mean also the country's lose faith in the basic bargain of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

That is that the five nuclear weapon states under the NPT, the US, the UK, France, China, and Russia, will steadily move toward nuclear disarmament,

and work to ensure that eventually they get to zero nuclear weapons.

While the other non-nuclear weapon states are supported in their peaceful nuclear energy programs, for example, and also in pursuing non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

So, I think that, that basic bargain I fear could come apart as a result of this invasion and the way in which China and Russia no longer seem very interested in

working on this absolutely vital problem.

There is another conference as well, that's taking place this week, the State Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear-Weapons.

Can you tell us about this meeting and its significance?

This TPNW as it's called, or otherwise known as the ban, Nuclear Ban Treaty, was negotiated over the past five years and entered into force,

just as Joe Biden was entering the White House in January of 2020.

And it's interesting that, in fact, the supporters of the Ban Treaty say that they are supporting it, because it will really bolster the Non-Proliferation Treaty regime

and strengthen it and help the Non-Proliferation Treaty regime to achieve its vital goals.

My own experience with the Ban Treaty, and the community supporting it, however, is that they are tending instead to criticize the NPT system, to undermine the NPT with

lesser standards in certain areas, for example, on nuclear safeguards.

So, I, myself am concerned about the Nuclear Ban Treaty.

But I do understand that many countries are supporting it.

They are both members of the NPT regime and members of the TPNW regime.

And so, I really hope to see more cooperation between the two regimes and that those countries who are members of both, can really fulfill its promise.

That is help to support the success of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Now, you've previously called for a bigger seat for China in the international arms control regime.

What type of role could China play when it comes to this discussion about nuclear non-proliferation?

China has been a very, I would say, good partner in certain regimes such as the Non-Proliferation Treaty regime.

Now for over 10-years, we have added a so, called P5 Process.

That's a process involving the nuclear weapons states of the NPT, China included as well as Russia, UK, France and the US.

And so, in this case, China has worked very well to try to bolster the NPT and cooperate provide some additional transparency.

But China has always been very nervous about providing too much information about its nuclear forces.

It argues that the United States and USSR, now the United States and Russia, have enormous deployments of nuclear weapons, 1550 warheads on each Russia and US side.

Which is, under the news START Treaty, a significant accomplishment.

But China still has far fewer weapons total.

They have about, well under 500 total warheads.

And so, they argue that as long as the United States and Russia have so many more, why should they come to the table?

Some experts fear that they are actually racing to build up to the level of the United States and the Russian Federation.

And so, for that reason, we need to keep a very sharp eye on China and what it is doing.

But I frankly, think this is the moment to try to invest them with more responsibility for avoiding a nuclear arms race, and that that should be an interest for them as well.

It will mean that they will have to be more open, they will have to open up and provide more information about what they are doing with their nuclear forces, with their nuclear modernization.

But it should be a matter of their national interest as well to avoid a general nuclear arms race.

So that's the basic point.

You worked under President Obama, who, you know, when he was president, he called for a world without nuclear weapons.

And he, you know, as I mentioned, he led nuclear disarmament talks with Russia, a lot of which you were also involved in.

How do you see the future of nuclear non- proliferation?

I fear sometimes that that restored commitment will only come on the back of a grave nuclear crisis, such as Russia fulfilling its threat to use a nuclear weapon in the Ukraine, in the Ukraine invasion.

I certainly hope that that will not happen because that is not a good reason to renew everybody's commitment to nuclear non-proliferation.

But there has been enough, I think, of concern arising publicly out of this crisis and all the nuclear saber rattling that I hope, come-what-may,

it can be a new impetus to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

It's been surprising very surprising to me.

I've seen nuclear weapons really being on the back burner for the public.

They don't really think about them day-in-day-out.

Same with national governments, they don't really think about them day-in-day-out.

But on the back of this crisis, there's a huge amount of public interest, certainly in the United States, and also a more attention by the government.

So, I do hope that we can see, again, some restoration of commitment to the nuclear non- proliferation regime and also avoid any kind of use of nuclear weapons in this invasion of Ukraine.

Rose Gottemoeller, so great to have you on the program.

Thank you so much for joining us.

The recent escalation by Russia has delivered a shocking reminder to the world - that the existential danger of nuclear weapons did not end with the Cold War.

Putin's aggression increases the potential for a NATO-Russian conflict that could quickly escalate.

That's why this year's upcoming NATO summit could be one of the most important in recent years.

Next time, we continue our conversation with Rose Gottemoeller - former Deputy Secretary General of NATO and get her insights on what to expect.

I'm Del Irani, thanks for your company.

I'll see you then.